What the Man in the Street Knows

Copyright © 2008-2009 by C. L. Brown – UnrestrictedPhilosophy.com

   We begin with the following remark: while for some philosophers “what is space?” may be to them at least a real, legitimate question worthy of speculative discussion and for, say, the non-philosopher, common man in the street it – upon first glance at least – maybe isn’t, we will not say in spite of this however that in his possible consideration of it the man in the street is not equipped to pertinently respond in some way or another to such said question.  In other words there are some noteworthy points to be made in terms of how the layman might respond if directly asked this very question by someone else.  If, for the sake of discussion, he was asked this question he might be apt to respond with something like “You know, space!” and perhaps even follow this reply with a gesture or a waving of his arms in a manner suggestive of his immediate spatial environment.  The significance of such a reply, or as some might say a lack of reply, as a possible answer on the part of the layman should not be overlooked or undervalued.  The question “what is space?” is precisely for the common man not a real question because in its being asked the question steps outside the bounds or limits of his everyday “life-world.”  This term we borrow directly from Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann and use it to denote, in their words, that prescientific “province of reality which the wide awake and normal adult simply takes for granted in the attitude of common sense.”¹  As such, the everyday life-world then is “the reality which seems self-evident to men remaining within the natural attitude.”²  For the common man in the street whom we can presume “operates” or lives most of the time unawarely within the natural attitude, what space is is something then more or less “self-evident” to him and is thus something taken (and to be taken) for granted by him for the purpose of his understanding not only himself but also his fellow man with whom he can then effectively communicate in terms of spatial language, that is, by being able to make intelligent use of the actual word “space.”  Thus, the notion that the common man if asked would respond to something like “what is space?” with a sense of incredulity that one might not really “know” what, say, space is is not too wrong an assessment to make here.  (One can envision here as an example of this a typical schoolboy’s meeting his teacher with, if anything, a look of you’ve got to be kidding me you’re asking me this if, as it turns out, he is ever directly asked this question by him/her.)  When one departs from the everyday life-world, it can now be said, “what is X?”-type of questions for the common man in the street at least tend to become inept and awkward if not outright disingenuous.  This seems to be especially true when X is held as a commonsensical or commonsensible “thing”, for lack of a better word, especially when it, i.e. X, is fostered – such as is space – as an elemental parcel of and within one’s everyday life-world. 

   If pressed, however, with the question “what is space?” such that space’s taken-for-grantedness, its self-evidence as it were is actually called into question, the man in the street might be apt to defer to a source considered to be authoritative enough to produce an appreciable “answer” or response of some sort.  If given enough time to reply the man in the street might decide to consult (the writings of a distinguished) philosopher or two in terms of their respective thoughts on the subject of (what is) space.  Why might he decide to consult a philosopher and not, say, someone else?  The answer may be no other reason than the thinking that in the word “space” the man in the street recognizes a word not necessarily important for its own meaning(s) but rather a word which has been historically and to this day is still often intimately linked by some philosophically inclined people to their respective cosmological (understood in the metaphysical sense) views of the universe.  (“Time”, “force”, “cause”, “purpose”, and perhaps even “will” are other such words which seem to be attuned as well by some people into their respective metaphysical, cosmological considerations of the universe.)  Quite often, however, whether he has the time to explore what a philosopher has to say on the matter or not the man in the street does tend to consult from time to time what for him would seem to be the one and only “true” sourcebook there is and which he’ll ever need, namely, the lexicon, that is, the dictionary.  Where one genuinely first encounters the extensive use of this source is the elementary school and as such the lexicon thenceforth becomes embedded in a way, as it were, as a part of the natural attitude.  What do we mean by this? Well, in the lexicon one encounters those standard, practical meanings for the word “space” as having been established by the learned class³ which the man in the street either already seems to know, as it were, or at least is somewhat familiar with.  In his consulting the lexicon the man in the street may reaffirm for himself that within the proper context the word “space” more or less means or denotes, say, either 

(1) a limited extent in one, two, or three dimensions, or

(2) an extent set apart or available, or

(3) a boundless three-dimensional extent in which objects and events occur and have relative position and direction, or

(4) the region beyond the earth’s atmosphere or beyond the solar system, or words to such effects, respectively.⁴

Actually, what we probably ought to really say here is that in reading for example the definiens “an extent set apart or available” or “a boundless three-dimensional extent”, etc., respectively, the man in the street in giving it some thought may ultimately declare to himself something to the effect that yea, come to think of it that is what people probably do mean by space when they do use the word “space” in such-and-such a context.  Really, though, that’s it; that’s all that dictionary definitions really do for a person.  Nevertheless, in what is peculiar to all of us, however, in our operating under the auspice of the everyday life-world is that these nominally legislated meanings of the word “space” as attributed to the ways in which the word is ordinarily and contextually used by us (as conditioned as it were by the learned class) are also quite frequently considered themselves to be definitions or significations of the reality of what space is, within the proper context of course.  In other words, when pressed with the issue of what X really is — where X is a common thing or object — we, in our being men of the street, do seemingly blissfully and unawarely accept at times the “appropriate” definiens, that is, the “best”, standardly determined meaning of the word “X” as given in the lexicon (presuming it’s in there) as being the (legislated) description of what X is.  What can probably be deemed here as being somewhat of an act of instinct on our part is then a viable feature of our thinking within what can be considered to be the natural attitude, namely, “the unspoken and unexamined belief that definitions unproblematically refer both to the nature of X and how the word ‘X’ is used.”⁵  Perhaps the principle behind this unspoken and unexamined belief is simply this: in its being made in reply to the question “what is X?” a filling-in-of-the-blank of the statement “X is . . .” with the “appropriate” definiens as given by a (good) dictionary is considered to be an irrefutable pronouncement upon X the thing because by the legislated definiens is understood what “X” the word irrefutably means as having been determined by the best minds of today in their study of the historical record of usage of the word “X.”  “Irrefutable” meaning especially in terms of the noun “X” can unexamingly become in belief the signification of what therefore is X the thing.  Granted, a filling-in-of-the-blank with what the situation or context might consider to be the “appropriate” definiens as to what space “is” might not always in itself seem to suffice.  Even if there is a situation in which “what is space?” is honestly asked of someone within the context that it, i.e. space, is, say, “an extent set apart or available”, not too many of us would probably ever feel greatly satisfied with such a response.  In fact all we may really say here in terms of a closer examination of a filling-in-of-the-blank with any one of the four definiens listed above as given to us by Webster’s is that (4) might seem to be a more placial aspect of (3) while (1) and (2), respectively, can be considered in ways as (being) “parts” or partial aspects of (3).  What we say here then is that perhaps in the end there is no multiplicity of “appropriate” definientia for a satisfactory filling-in-of-the-blank; rather, there is or at least seems to be one definiens, as it were, to be used, namely, (3).  To unequivocally regard the response then “space is a boundless three-dimensional extent . . .” as the “answer” to the Socratically considered question “what is space?” is nonetheless to be operating within the natural attitude, an attitude which in any event may be something forgivable for all of us as having. 

   The thinking that space is, for lack of a better word and description, something which only the philosopher has access to in terms of the knowing of what it is can be quickly debunked in noting both the academician’s and layman’s ability to understand what is meant when someone says, for example, “There’s enough space on that shelf in which to place this book” or “The reach of space is vast, seemingly infinite”, respectively.  We can find elsewhere in the existent literature thoughts similar to the one here at hand, namely, that of a general ineffectiveness on the part of speculative, i.e. philosophical, disquisition to in effect redefine what something like space or time, respectively, is.  Consider here the following sentiment concerning time expressed by Dean Turner (his emphasis).

Metaphysicians like to dispute delicate questions such as whether the time process is itself constituted of a sequence of discrete moments (“chronons”) or is a pure continuum with no discrete moments involved.  Such questions are interesting but of no crucial necessity for discussion, for the simple reason that metaphysicians, however hard they may try, cannot get around the man in the street’s intuitive awareness of the need for a common whileness for the sake of intelligibility of thought about time.⁶

In terms of time its being either a constituted sequence of discrete moments or a pure continuum with no discrete moments involved or even something other than this is something for Michael Dummett⁷ and other learned metaphysicians to discuss and debate.  All in all, for the common man in the street, however, such a matter of metaphysical disquisition concerning time is interesting, no doubt, and yet it is of no crucial necessity in terms of discussion for him. 

WORKS FROM WHICH WE HAVE QUOTED

Mish, Frederick C., edit. Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary.  Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster Inc., 1985.

Schiappa, Edward.  “Constructing Reality Through Definitions: The Politics of Meaning.”  Lecture presented at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of Writing and the Composition, Literacy, and Rhetorical Studies Minor, University of Minnesota-Minneapolis, 1998.  http://writing.umn.edu/docs/speakerseries_pubs/Schiappa.pdf.  (Accessed April 29, 2008).

Schutz, Alfred and Thomas Luckmann.  The Structures of the Life-World.  Translated by Richard M. Zaner and J. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.  Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980.

Turner, Dean.  “The Fallacy of Werkmeister’s Reification of Space and Time.”  In The Einstein Myth and the Ives Papers.  Edited by Dean Turner and Richard Hazelett.  Pasadena, California: Hope Publishing House, 2005.

ENDNOTES

1.  Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, The Structures of the Life-World, trans. Richard M. Zaner and J. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980), p. 3.

2.  Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, The Structures of the Life-World, trans. Richard M. Zaner and J. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980), p. 3.

3.  Our reference here to the learned class emphasizes the notion that the type of definition as found in a standard dictionary is, in the words of Richard Robinson, “a form of history.  It refers to the real past.  It tells what certain persons meant by a certain word at a certain less or more specified time and place” (p. 35).^† (As Robinson states, the question “What does this word mean?” is more accurately the question “What do (or did) certain persons use this word to mean?”)  The emphasis here on meaning as being the meaning meant by certain persons is noteworthy for our purpose at hand in that the definitions of the words in the dictionary “tend to be histories not of all the usages prevailing at a given time and place but of those of the preferred group of persons” (p. 37).  The preferred group of persons here is quite generally the “respected” or “educated” class.  The aim of the dictionary then is more to help “get us accepted by the educated rather than to describe how men have actually spoken and written” (p. 38).  In the end then the authoritative character which is invested by us in a (good and respected) dictionary is due mainly to our “human nature driving us to seek excellence and the reputation of excellence, and of human customs and taboos placing goodness and badness now in one set of usages and later in another” (p. 38). 

^†Richard Robinson, Definition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965).

4.  Frederick C. Mish, edit., Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, (Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster Inc., 1985), p. 1129.

5.  Edward Schiappa, “Constructing Reality Through Definitions: The Politics of Meaning”  (lecture presented at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of Writing and the Composition, Literacy, and Rhetorical Studies Minor, University of Minnesota-Minneapolis, 1998).  http://writing.umn.edu/docs/speakerseries_pubs/Schiappa.pdf.  (Accessed April 29, 2008).

6.  Dean Turner, “The Fallacy of Werkmeister’s Reification of Space and Time,” in The Einstein Myth and the Ives Papers, ed. Dean Turner and Richard Hazelett (Pasadena, California: Hope Publishing House, 2005), p. 246.  The emphasis is Turner’s.

7.  We mention Michael Dummett here on account of his asking the very question “Is Time a Continuum of Instants?”^† in his paper published in Philosophy with this as its title. 

^†Dummett, Michael.  “Is Time a Continuum of Instants?”  Philosophy 75, no. 294 (2000): 497-515.