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Φ Unrestricted Philosophy - What is Space? Φ Complimentary Investigations into Space Copyright © 2006-2009 by C. L. Brown – UnrestrictedPhilosophy.com
What we plan to do in this paper is to address
and clarify some insights, thoughts, and concerns with regard to the general
topic of space which occurred to us
during the writing of our first two papers concerning the subject.1 Such subject matter we have felt is
best presented separate from our theme-based material, thus the appearance of
this paper. We do not intend with the
material presented here to advance any one, coherent theme but rather to just
express a varied collection of opinionated work, work which may in fact have
very little if anything at all to do with what we have previously
written. Our approach here is modeled on the numbered, sectional format
employed in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s posthumous Philosophical Investigations.
§1.
How we do (erroneously)
come at times to regard space as some thing in itself is, for lack of a better
description, a process of sorts which cannot be divorced from our language of
it, that is, our language in (explicit) terms of “space.” There is
reality, yes – we do not deny this – and yet it is a reality quite often, if
not naturally, grounded in or anchored in language. (Quite often and unfortunately for us this
language is couched in terms of the substantive,
which serves to adorn and yet needlessly complicate and convolute such said
language of reality for us.) ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ §2. If we say, in
the vein of Friedrich Waismann, that space is nothing
more than what is explained by means of the spoken (or written) use of the term
“space”, then it could be construed by some at least that we are advocating a
universe in which words come first, that is, a universe in which words and their use do preface our
conceptual descriptions of the physical world. If such is the case, and
we’re not necessarily saying here that it is, then we could be seen with it as
adhering to nothing less than a kind of religious
belief.2 ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ §3. We make it
clear in our assessment of the question “what is space?” that there has never
been an attempt on our part to actually “answer” it scientifically, nor
deductively for that matter as well. Space may appear at first glance to be an
object of science, i.e. something best and perhaps more properly understood
within the domain of physical if not theoretical science or at least the mathematical
sciences. Space does up to a point at least appear to be something possibly
explainable by means of the so-called scientific method. We have
argued previously, however, that it is not.3 Space might only appear as such in
part due to the subtle and everyday deceptions our language of space does from
time to time impose on us. ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ §4. Before one can
contemplate a so-called “nature” or “essence” of space — if such contemplation
is even possible(!) — and thus possibly as a
result of the perplexity into which such contemplation can lead him ask of
himself “what, then, is space?”, he must first
have learned how to use the word
“space” in everyday affairs. It is in
the learning of (how to use) this word – a process of sorts – whereby he
unknowingly does answer for himself what space is (Waismann). To then actually ask of oneself or of another the question “what is space?” is to thus beg of a question’s being asked. “This begs
the question”: how often do we hear this in everyday affairs? ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ §5. In especially the
science fantasy genre, a writer is free to experiment in the language –
fanciful if not artistic – of “space.” “Time” as well is another example
of a substantive used at the disposal and discretion of the writer. When
we encounter these words as being used in, say, a science fiction or science
fantasy novel, we have only to agree or disagree with the way or manner in
which they are being presented and used.4 (This leads
us to what now follows.) ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ §6. Read a book, say, for example, a science fiction novel. Read it for recreation; read it for escapism. Nonetheless, in reading it we may very well come across terms like “hyperspace” or “time warp”, etc.5 Upon doing so we need not feel distraught in any way by the seemingly scientific and technical complexity which must surely underline the ideas behind such terms. Instead, we simply need to just regard such language – nothing more and nothing less – as being the author’s thoughts now made public in terms literally of “space” and/or “time”, respectively. The only task for us then is to determine whether the author’s thoughts developed with and through such language are literarily if not aesthetically pleasing to us. ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ §7.
The true
power of a lexical, dictionary definition is this: by the enlistment of the
definition of a term as such we are empowered to adjudicate, i.e. pass
judgment, upon whether a person is misusing a particular term. In other words, we are entitled to be able to
pronounce judgment as to whether one is using a word to mean what the
dictionary indicates its meaning to be.
That is really all there is to it.
With such definitions – that is, the ones which one acquires when he
“looks it up” in a dictionary – all we can do is nothing more than really
praise someone as being correct or accuse someone as being wrong in terms of
how he or she literally uses, either in speech or in script, a word or group of
words. Such judicature does occasionally find its
place in society such as in letters to the editor. The general public can
be reminded of if not then actually swayed into believing in a magesterium surrounding a definition quoted from a
dictionary. ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ §8.
When all is
said and done and we have tried our best at eliminating our asking the question
“what is space?” by means of the enlistment of the argumentation presented so
far in our first two papers6,
we may still in spite of all of this feel that we have not thoroughly answered
our question or quelled our desire for an answer. What is space?
A little voice pops into our head (mind) and tells us in our not having
“properly” answered — whatever that means(!) — this question we are in some roundabout way thus
denying a search for and explication of something which surely in some way or
another is a basic, constituent part of the actual, physical world in which we
live and exist. (Such a feeling of dread and fear is not always uncommon
amongst philosophers!) What we say
in response is simply this: all we do find in the end is the substantive, the
term, the word “space” and the way or ways in which it is used throughout our
language. To offer anything else on this matter would be to engage in
nothing short of metaphysical disquisition.
Such disquisition can ultimately lead to unverifiable propositions
concerning the world. Unverifiable propositions can ultimately lead to
unverifiable pictures of the world, hence a source of our confusion and thus
our asking the very question itself. ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ §9. What we have written so far in our papers to
date we hold as being applicable if not at least in some sense accurate:
troublesome questions of the form “What is X?” are in turn ultimately
dissolvable by us – if we so choose to do this – by means of our understanding
the way(s) in which we use the
term “X” relative to the language which surrounds it. In this light then some of the traditionally
big “what is”-questions of philosophy, so to speak, can seemingly be dissolved
away. In proceeding, however, what if as one of those “big”
philosophical questions that great question “what is the meaning of life?” is
asked either of us or by us? Do we
relegate in this case “the meaning of life” as “X” and thus consider it here to
be like “space” or “time”, respectively, in that this question which inquires
into its, i.e. life’s, essence (purpose) can likewise be summarily dissolved by
us? In other words, can we invoke the
same thinking as we did previously with space,
namely, in that the meaning of life
is that which is explained by means of the sensibly spoken (or written) use of the
terminology “the meaning of life”? Or, on the other hand, is there something
about the meaning of life which makes it stand out and apart
from, say, space or time such that we just can’t dissolve this
expression into the language in which we commonly address it and with which we
commonly adorn it? For us we tend to
side here with both in a way: the question as to what is the meaning of life is
dissolvable, yes, but – unlike, say, with “space” or “time” – it is not so much
as dissolvable in the language surrounding the use of the terminology “the
meaning of life” as it is in the living of a life in which this question
disappears. To put it another way, the
question of the meaning of life is, in the words of Caleb Thompson, “resolved,
instead, by discovering a way of life in which there is meaning, in which these
questions do not arise.”7 What
is the meaning of life?: this
question is resolved (dissolved) in the living of a life in which there is
meaning and in which this question thus does not appear. WORKS FROM WHICH WE HAVE QUOTED Thompson, Caleb. “Wittgenstein, Tolstoy and the Meaning of Life.” Philosophical Investigations 20 (1997): 109. ENDNOTES 1. See C. L. Brown, “A Wittgensteinian-Waismannian
Dissolution of the Question of Space” (http://www.unrestrictedphilosophy.com/dissolution.htm) and “Thoughts Concerning Wittgensteinian-Waismannian Dissolution in General” (http://www.unrestrictedphilosophy.com/further_thoughts.htm),
respectively. 2. Such thinking on
our part – that such a notion be akin in some way to a kind of religious belief
– does not find itself without precedent in a way. We read in the Gospel according to John, “In
the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God”
(John 1:1).† We do not, of course, mean in any way to hold
as being equivalent to one another the “words” to which we refer here and “the
Word” (in Greek, Logos) of which the
author of the Gospel speaks, the latter as being ultimately identified as the
Son, the Incarnation, or God made flesh.
Instead, however, we mean nothing more with this comment than our
entertainment of the thought that possibly the word – in or maybe not in a Platonic sense – does possess an
ineffable power of its own when it comes to our conceptualizing what could be
termed here as “accounts” or “descriptions” of the real, sensory, or outer
world. †Confraternity of Christian Doctrine, The New American Bible (Iowa Falls, Iowa: World Bible Publishers, 1986), p. 1137.
3. See n. 15 of C. L.
Brown, “A Wittgensteinian-Waismannian Dissolution of
the Question of Space”
(http://www.unrestrictedphilosophy.com/dissolution.htm). 4. Our comment here
stems from something which authors Alan Sokal and
Jean Bricmont write in Fashionable Nonsense:
Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science. In their book Sokal and Bricmont engage in a
critical examination of the “mystification, deliberately obscure language,
confused thinking, and the misuse of scientific concepts” as employed amongst
noteworthy intellectuals of today’s post-modernist movement (Preface to the
English Edition, p. xi).† A passage written in the Introduction is pertinent
to our purpose at hand. Under the heading of “Poetic License” – in which
is discussed an allowance of sorts as being given to the artistic use of scientific
terminology and ideas – Sokal and Bricmont
write (p. 10), If a poet uses words like “black hole” or “degree of freedom”
out of context and without really understanding their scientific meaning, it
doesn’t bother us. Likewise, if a science-fiction writer uses secret
passageways in space-time in order to send her characters back to the era of
the Crusades, it is purely a question of taste whether one likes or dislikes
the technique. It is the last sentence here which serves as a catalyst for
what we have written in the text, namely, our only having to agree or disagree (like or
dislike) the way in which a particular (scientific) word or (scientific)
concept is utilized by an author. †Alan Sokal
and Jean Bricmont, Fashionable Nonsense:
Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science (New York: Picador USA, 1998). 5. Of course, such
instances of use can be found in the movies and in television as well. The very popular Star Wars films and Star Trek
series come to mind here. “Travelin’ through hyperspace ain’t
like dustin’ crops, boy”, says Han Solo to Luke
Skywalker in Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope.
What
the language of “hyperspace” here does is allow us the viewer not only to enjoy
but also to critique the subsequent cinematic portrayal of hyperspace and, in
this particular case, the subsequently depicted movement “through” it. (For the record, hyperspace remains nothing
more than a fictitious plot device.) 6. Again, see C. L.
Brown, “A Wittgensteinian-Waismannian Dissolution of
the Question of Space” (http://www.unrestrictedphilosophy.com/dissolution.htm) and “Thoughts Concerning Wittgensteinian-Waismannian Dissolution in General” (http://www.unrestrictedphilosophy.com/further_thoughts.htm),
respectively. 7. Caleb
Thompson, “Wittgenstein, Tolstoy and the Meaning of Life,” Philosophical
Investigations 20 (1997): 109. In his article Thompson offers an excellent
evaluation on the influence Leo Tolstoy in his A Confession probably did
have on the development of Wittgenstein’s thinking in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
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